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CONDITIONAL DELIVERY OF WRITTEN CONTRACTS
ARTHUR L. CORBIN
Two parties are negotiating the terms of a contract, involving
perhaps a sale, a promissory note, a lease or other conveyance of
an interest in land. They draw up a formal document in writing,
full and complete in all of its aspects. They sign and in some
cases attach a seal. Then it is delivered by one party to the
other, with the clear oral statement that the document is not to
be binding on him unless A approves the deal,, or that his duty
thereunder is to be conditional on B's signing also,2 or that the
rent provided in the instrument is to be payable only after certain
repairs have been made,3 or that the document is to be null and
void if C shall disapprove. Or one of the parties to the document
delivers it to a third person, with a clear oral direction to such
third person to deliver it over to the promisee or grantee only
upon his paying a sum of money or upon the happening of some
other condition. What are the legal relations of the parties be-
fore the happening of the condition? Has a "valid" contract
been made? Is the written paper a "contract"? If the obligee
sues on the -written document is proof of the oral statement as
to the condition precedent prevented by the parol evidence rule?
If a sealed instrument is delivered to a third person, to be de-
livered to the grantee or obligee on a parol condition, it is called
an escrow. What is an escrow? Is an escrow a deed or a con-
tract or a mere piece of paper? What legal relations does
delivery of an escrow create?
It is easy to ask questions; and it is easy to give a stereotyped
answer to them-for to some of the above questions there is a
IPym v. Campbell, 6 El. & Bl. 370 (Q. B. 185G) ; Ware v. Allen, 128 U. S.
590, 9 Sup. Ct. 174 (1888).
2 Beard v. Boylan, 59 Conn. 181, 22, Atl. 152 (1890) ; Alexander v. Wilkes,
11 Lea, 221 (Tenn. 1883).
3 Davis v. Jones, 17 C. B. 625 (1856).
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traditional answer. Are the answers wrong? If careful analysis
shows them to be so, we need not be surprised; for it is no secret
that the law develops by conscious and unconscious fiction and
that the meaning of what we lawyers say can be determined only
by a close analysis of what we decide and do.
There is a vast mass of material on the subject of this article.
An attempt to exhaust it would lead us back to the very begin-
ning of the .Year Books and would involve us in the law of con-
veyance of property, both real and personal, and in the entire
field of contracts, both formal and informal. No such exhaustive
examination is here attempted. The original purpose of the
writer was to determine the legal operation of a sealed promise
delivered to a third person as an escrow. The attainment of this
purpose, however, has required some investigation into other
kinds of escrows and other kinds of delivery.
4
DELIVERY
Much has been written as to what constitutes a "delivery."
Like all other legal terms, this one has a varied usage causing as
cases multiply an increasing amount of difficulty for student,
lawyer and judge. There has been difference of olinion as to
what constitutes a legally operative, delivery for specific pur-
poses. Decisions have so shifted the concept behind the term that
it is no longer merely the physical tradition from one hand to
another as a man of business may suppose. It is believed, how-
ever, that all still agree that delivery consists of conduct on the
part of the grantor or obligor expressive of an intent on his part.
At times it is also held that there must be similar conduct on the
part of the grantee, obligee, or other recipient. In any case
delivery is purely factual in character; it is a group of operative
facts and not a jural relation or group of jural relations.
If delivery is an operative fact, what is its legal operation?
What are the jural relations created? This depends upon the
res delivered and the particular type of delivery used. The
factual conduct of the one making delivery may be expressive of
one kind of intent or of another entirely different kind. The
physical res (apparently a sine qua non) differs in quality and
character, the accompanying words diffr, the previous history
and relations of the parties differ. As all of these vary, the jur-
istic result of delivery varies. Suppose that A drops a gold piece
4As to conditional delivery of deeds of land, see Bigelow, Conditional
Deliveries of Deeds of Land (1913) 26 HARv. L. Rsv. 565; Tiffany, Con-
ditional Delivery of Deeds (1914) 14 CoL. L. REV. 389; Ballantine, Delivery
in Escrow and the Parol Evidence Rule (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 826;
Rundell, Delivery and Acceptance of Deeds in Wisconsin (1921) 1 Wis. L.
REV. 65; Aigler, Is a Contract Necessary to Create an Effective Escrow
(1918) 16 MiciI. L. REv. 569.
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DELIVERY OF WRITTEN CONTRACTS
into B's hand. The legal operation of that act would be affected
by any of the following facts: (1) B was pointing a pistol at A's
head; (2) B was A's son; (3) B had said "lend me some money";
(4) the gold piece was heated so that it was of a glowing golden
red, not observed by B. Thus the legal effect of the delivery
might be a gift, a loan, a tort, or a crime.
The same variation in the legal operation of delivery eists
where the physical res is a paper document containing written
words, with the addition that such operation is now affected not
only by surrounding facts but also by the written words them-
selves. Thus, (1) the document may be handed to a person not
named in the writing to be held by him solely as the agent or
custodian of the party so delivering. Such a delivery does not
cause the words of the document itself to have any legal operation
whatever, even though those words purport to make a grant or a
promise to some person expressly named. A second delivery by
the depositary to the named grantee or obligee would also fail
to make the words of the document legally operative, in the ab-
sence of an authority or an estoppel. The physical delivery to the
custodian is not totally inoperative, since it creates the legal
relations involved in bailment; but its operation goes no further.
(2) If the document is delivered to the grantee or obligee
named therein, greater difficulty arises in determining its legal
operation, especially if there is an attempt to make it dependent
upon an extrinsic oral condition6 Written promises so delivered
are considered herein.
5 Bigelow, op. cit. supra note 4, at 567; 1 DnvLLN, DEms (18S7) §§ 318, 324.
If it is shown that the parties contemplated further negotiation and fur-
ther voluntary expressions by one or both, it will usually be held that a power
of revocation exists and that there is neither a contract nor a delivery as an
escrow. In Miller v. Sears, 91 Calif. 282, 27 Pac. 589 (1891) deeds were
given to the defendant as depositary, the plaintiff saying: "When every-
thing is all right and perfected, you give these papers to me, and thee
others to him." The parties had not yet passed on titles and had no ab-
stracts. The court held that no contract had been made, that the documents
were still subject to the plaintiff's control, and decreed that they should be
returned to the plaintiff.
Handing an instrument to the scrivener or attorney without any in-
structions as to further delivery, no conditions being specified, is not a
delivery that in any way affects the legal operation of the instrument, and
it is not an escrow. Carr v. Hoxie, Fed. Cas. No. 2438 (C. C. R. I. 1828);
Tanner v. Imle, 253 S. W. 665 (Tex. 1923).
Handing an instrument to the grantee himself for the sole purpose of
enabling him to deposit it with a third person as an escrow is not a delivery.
Ford v. Moody, 169 Ark. 649, 276 S. W. 595 (1925).
Handing a box with papers in it to a servant of the grantor who retained
control is no delivery. Porter v. Woodhouse, 59 Conn. 563, 22 Atl. 299 (1890).
6 The conflict as to whether an extrinsic oral condition can affect the
operation of a deed of conveyance delivered to the grantee will not be con-
sidered herein. See articles by Bigelow, Tiffany and Ballantine, spra note
-4. See WimMORE, EWDENCE: (2d ed. 1923) § 2408.
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(3) The document may be handed to a third person to hold as
the agent or custodian for the grantee or obligee, subject to no
condition extrinsically expressed. In this case the document is
operative exactly as it would be if delivery had been to the grantee
or obligee in person,7 except that when the latter first learns of
such delivery he has power to nullify it by a disclaimer.
(4) The document may be handed to a third person as the
agent or custodian for both the grantor and the grantee, to be
delivered over to the grantee at some specified future time. The
document is certainly legally operative in this case, there being
no extrinsic condition of any sort other than that of the passage
of time. If the document is a conveyance, the property interest
created will be said to be "vested." If the document is a promise,
it will be at once operative in accordance with its expressed
words, subject only to the passage of the specified time.
(5) The document may be delivered to a third person as the
-trustee or custodian for both parties, with expressed oral direc-
tions that it is to be delivered over to the grantee or obligee only
upon the happening of some future condition, certain or uncertain
of occurrence. 8 This is usually called a "conditional delivery"
and the document is said to be delivered as an "escrow." One
purpose of the present article is to consider the legal operation of
a promissory document so delivered, with respect to the law of
Delivery may be as an escrow to the solicitor of the grantee. Watkins
v. Nash, L. R. 20 Eq. 262 (1875).
7 Bigelow, op. cit. supra note 4, at 565; Doe d. Garnons v. Knight, 5 B. & C.
671 (K. B. 1826); Blight v. Schenck, 10 Pa. 285 (1849); Kidner v. Keith,
15 C. B. N. S. 35 (1863). It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss
cases stating a different rule.
T.1-e deed is operative unconditionally if delivery is to one of several
grantees without using the word "escrow" and without specifying a con-
dition, even though the grantor may have intended it to be used only as
security for money to be obtained. London Freehold Co. v. Suffield [1897]
2 Ch. 608.
8A, distinction has been drawn between cases where the condition is an
event certain to occur and those where it is uncertain; in the former case,
the document is not an escrow but a present deed of conveyance. Wheel-
wright v. Wheelwright, 2 Mass. 447 (1807); Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis.
644 (1872) ; Grilley v. Atkins, 78 Conn. 380, 62 Atl. 337 (1905). Differences
in degree of certainty are of importance to the grantee; but the difference
has no bearing on the questions discussed in this article. Where the grantor
delivers a deed to a depositary to be delivered to the grantee only on the
grantor's death, the delivery is irrevocable and the grantee will become
owner even though the grantor wrongfully takes back the deed and des-
troys it. Hudson v. Hudson, 287 Ill. 286, 122 N. E. 497 (1919); Emmons
v. Harding, 162 Ind. 154, 70 N. E. 142 (1904); Grilley v. Atkins, supra
(depositary refused to surrender the deed back, but the grantor executed
a new deed of conveyance to another person). But the same is true of any
delivery as an escrow. As to this distinction, see Tiffany, op. cit. supra note
4, at 397; Rundell, op. cit. supra note 4, at 82; Ballantine, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 832, 833.
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DELIVERY OF WRITTEN CONTRACTS
contract and not the law of property. It may be said in passing,
however, with respect to deeds of conveyance so delivered, that
such a delivery at once very definitely affects the legal relations
of the grantor and the grantee, both with each other and with
third persons. It is of no service, indeed it is a positive dis-
service, to say that "title" either does or does not pass on the
first delivery. The document clearly "takes effect" upon the
first delivery; but the question remains as to what is the effect
that it "takes," and what is the property interest of each party
prior to the happening of the condition.
It is necessary at this point to consider the meaning of the
term "condition."
WHAT IS A CONDITION
To determine the meaning of "conditional delivery" it is neces-
sary to answer the question: W"rhat is a "condition" ? It, too, is
a fact and not a jural relation. Thus, if one promises to pay a
sum of money if (or on condition that) his ship comes in, the
coming in of the ship is the condition. If one creates an estate
in land to vest (or to devest) upon the death of A, A's death is
the condition-an operative fact. A condition is not a promise;
it is not even a group of words, although it may always be
described in a group of words.
When we say that a promise is conditional we do not mean that
there is no promise. This is true even though the condition is
a fact that may possibly never occur at all. The condition may
be the death of A, certain to occur but uncertain as to time; it
may be the coming in of a ship or the payment of a sum of money
by A, an act of a person or other event that may never occur
at all.
Furthermore, when we say that a promise is conditional we
do not mean that it is not valid or not binding. The formation
of what we call a contract occurs upon the expression of assent
by the two parties. The terms of the contract assented to may
involve promises by one or by both parties, and one or all of these
promises may be conditional. No one believes that the present
existence of a valid and binding contract for the erection of a
building would be prevented by the fact that the owner's promise
to pay is conditional upon the architect's approval and that the
builder's promise to build is conditional upon the absence of a
strike. Conditional promises may be ample consideration for
each other, and the conditional contract is valid and binding.
A conditional promise, on the other hand, is not izmiediatedy
enforceable until the condition has occurred, if the condition is
a condition precedent. Indeed, it may not be immediately en-
forceable even after a condition has occurred; for the time set
for performance may not yet have arrived, and there may be still
447
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other conditions precedent. The life history of a contract is a
chronological series of facts, some of them operative and others
not operative. There may be inoperative preliminary negotia-
tion. There may be counter-offers, rejections, conditional ac-
ceptances; but there must eventually be an operative offer and an
unconditional acceptance thereof. At this point we say that
there is a valid and binding contract; but we do not mean by this
that either party can at once get a judgment or court decree.
The series of events must have proceeded further before judicial
enforcement is available. There must be a breach of the valid
and binding contract; and, in the absence of any repudiation,
there is no breach as long as some condition precedent has not
yet occurred. To make out a prima facie affirmative case, there-
fore, a plaintiff must allege offer and acceptance, the occurrence
of all conditions precedent, and breach by the defendant.
It should be apparent from the foregoing that when two parties
have agreed upon terms, one of which provides that a certain
fact or event shall operate as a condition precedent, it is quite
incorrect to say that as long as the condition has not occurred
there is as yet no contract, or no valid contract, or no binding
contract. Yet it is by making such statements that courts have
admitted oral evidence of conditions precedent in the teeth of
the parol evidence rule. Indeed, cases of this sort are almost
innumerable.
WHAT IS AN ESCROW
What is an escrow and what is its legal operation? Literally
the word means .merely a writing,9 without regard to signing,
sealing, or delivery. In Anglo-American law, however, it has
been most frequently used in connection with writings under seal.
9Various dictionaries explain the word "escrow" as follows: BYRNE'S
LAW DICTIONARY (1923): "apparently from Norman French escrit, which
itself was derived from the Latin scriptum, a writing." KELIIAM'S NORMAN
DICTIONARY (1779): "Escrowes, rolls of parchment, scrolls." TEIRMES
DE LA LEY (Am. ed. 1812): "An escrow is a deed delivered to a third person
to be the deed of the party upon a future condition; and is called in Latin
schedula. Rast. Ent. 181." HOLTHOUSE's LAW DICTIONARY (Penington's
ed. 1847): "from the Fr. jcrou, a scroll." BURRiLL'S LAW DICTIONARY (2d.
ed. 1871): "(Lat. scriptum, schedula)." It is said that in Littleton's time
the word was written "escrovet," and that "The radical idea appears to be,
a writing the contents of which are temporarily kept out of view, as by being
put in a third hand, by rolling up, enclosing in wax, etc." Littleton describes
a partition of land, each portion of the land being written alone "in a little
scroll (en un petit escrovet) and shall be covered all over with wax, in the
manner of a little ball (d'un petit pile), so that no one can see the scroll,"
each partitioner then drawing his scroll from a hat.
The OxFoRD DICTIONARY (1897). gives also "Escroll" as an obsolete form,
and derives the word from "Old French escroe, escroue-scrap, shred, strip
of parchment, scroll."
448
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DELIVERY OF WRITTEN CONTRACTS
In the period of the Year Books the question most litigated was
put in this form: Is the writing the grantor's "deed" or is it
merely an "escrow"? It would appear in the light of this an-
tithesis than an escrow is not a deed at all; and numberless state-
ments to that effect have been handed down to us. 0
When we consider, however, the cases in which the term escrow
has been used, and observe the varieties of legal operation that
have been given to writings in the various stages of their career,
it will be observed that the courts do not make that legal opera-
tion depend upon the term of description used. Instead, they
determine the legal operation first, and then choose a descriptive
term that seems to justify it. The document may be operative
in one way and not in another; in holding it to be operative in
the one way, a court will call it a deed, and in holding it to be
inoperative in the other way will call it an escrow.
It has been supposed that a distinction could be taken between
a delivery to a depositary as the deed of the grantor to be de-
livered over on condition, and a delive- as an escrow to take
effect as a deed on the performance of a condition. It was sup-
posed that the former was a deed and that if the grantee should
get possession by any means, he could maintain action thereon
and the grantor could not plead gion est factuzm; but otherwise
in the latter case.- This was properly disapproved by Kent,'2
and is not a sound distinction. The document is the grantor's
deed in either case, its future legal operation being alike de-
pendent on fulfillment of the condition."
An escrow is a written document, delivered to a person other
than the grantee or obligee named therein, in its final and com-
pleted form, the depositary being instructed to hold it and to
deliver it to the grantee or obligee on the fulfillment of some con-
'10 SMITH, CoNrRACTS (6th ed. 1878) *8 : "If that condition be performcd,
it becomes an absolute deed; till then it continues an escrow, and, if the
condition never be performed, it never becomes a deed at all."
n See CoMYN, DIGEST, tit. Fait, A, 3; SHEPPARD, ToucnsTr E, 058, 059;
Murray v. Earl of Stair, 2 B. & C. 82 (K. B. 1823) where a verdict
for the plaintiff was sustained because delivered as his decd, and evidence of
the depositary that it was delivered to the grantee in breach of a provision
that certain notes were to be surrendered before such delivery was treated
as immaterial.
24 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 130) 4.17. See also Hall v. Harris,
40 N. C. 303 (1848).
13 State Bank v. Evans, 15 N. J. L. 154 (135). Tiffany, loc. cit. ip;'a
note 4, says: "an instrument in the form of a deed, which is conditionally
delivered, is delivered as a deed, an instrument capable of legal operation,
and not as a mere piece of paper. Otherwise it could not become legally
operative upon the satisfaction of the condition. In the case of a con-
ditional delivery, a delivery in escrow, the maker of the instrument in efLect
says: 'I now deliver this as my act and deed, provided such a condition
is satisfied,' and not 'I now deliver this as a mere piece of paper, provided
such a condition is satisfied."'
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note , sa s: " i str e t i t f r f n c , i i ally
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dition not specified in the document itself. Such a document is
often a deed of conveyance, a contract under seal, a bond, a note,
or a release. The character of the instrument as an escrow is
fixed by the provision for performance of a condition, and the
word "escrow" is not at all necessary.1 4
If an escrow is a writing made by the person delivering it,
money cannot be an escrow. Much less can a debt (the legal
duty to make a payment) be an escrow in the historical use of
that word. Nevertheless, money can be deposited with a holder
to be paid over to another person on the fulfillment of specified
conditions, with legal results strictly analogous to those relating
to escrows, and such money is said to be deposited "in escrow." 15
If the money is a segregated physical entity, the grantee gets a
conditional property interest in the chattel and the depositary is
a bailee; if the money is deposited in a bank, to be mingled with
its general funds, the grantee gets a conditional contract right,
the depositary being held as a trustee for both parties, but not as
a bailee. On fulfillment of the condition the obligee has a legal
right to the money against the depositary.10 On non-fulfillment
of the condition the depositor has a legal right against the de-
positary to a return of the money.
1 7
YEAR BOOK VIEWS OF ESCROW
The legal operation of a deed delivered as an escrow on certain
extrinsic conditions puzzled the lawyers of the Middle Ages as
much as it does those of to-day. The substantive law was usually
stated in terms of procedure and of formality; in a lesser degree
such is still the case. It was much debated whether as against a
plaintiff who sued in debt on obligation the defendant could plead
the general issue (nient son fait) in cases where the document
had been delivered as an escrow and the grantee had obtained
possession wrongfully without having fulfilled the condition.
The general opinion was that such a plea was proper, the theory
being that before the second delivery the document was merely
an escrow and not a deed.s From that day to this, the problem
14 White v. Bailey, 14 Conn. 271 (1841); Clark v. Gifford, 10 Wend. 310
(N. Y. 1833); Nash v. Flyn, 1 J. & LaT. 162, 175 (Ch. 1844).
15 See State Bank v. Schultze, 199 N. W. 138 (N. D. 1924).
16 Harris v. Snyder, 55 Misc. 306, 105 N. Y. Supp. 502 (1907). As to
innocent purchasers the depositary is sometimes held to have the power of
a trustee.
17State Bank v. Parker, 69 Fla. 258, 67 So. 915 (1915); Parker State
Bank v. Pennington, 9 Fed. (2d) 966 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
18 Y. B. 8 Hen. VI, f. 26, pl. 15; 10 Hen. VI, f. 25, pl. 85; cf. 9 Hen. VI,
f. 37, pl. 12; 14 Hen. VI, f. 1, pl. 4; 19 Hen. VI, f. 58, pl 22.
In the Year Books the term "escrow" is used to denote "writing obliga-
tory" that has not yet been delivered to the grantee so as to be operative to
create a legally enforceable right in him. Sometimes "escript" is used as
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DELIVERY OF WRITTEN CONTRACTS
has seemed to many minds to turn on whether the document
"takes effect" at the first delivery or at the second, without con-
sidering an intermediate position that each delivery may be
operative to some extent.10 The litigated issue in these cases
was usually whether the defendant owed an enforceable legal duty
to the plaintiff before fulfillment of the condition, the courts
rightly holding that he did not. Because of the formalism of that
day and the crudity of analysis of legal relations, it was thought
that the just result could be attained only by holding that the
document was not yet the defendant's deed.
Even at that time the escrow was held to be operative if a
second delivery by the grantor or obligor became impossible by
reason of his death (or in case of a woman, by her marriage)
before fulfillment of the condition, in case the condition vas prop-
erly fulfilled thereafter."  This holding caused it to be argued
that the first delivery must have been fully operative, and that a
release delivered as an escrow could be pleaded in bar if the re-
leasee got possession of it without fulfilling the conditions.21 The
appearance of logic in this position did not cause the court to
adopt it.
Delivery of a sealed bond to a third person subject to a parol
condition was very common much earlier than this.22  Chattels
practically interchangeable with "escrow," the document being so described
before any delivery whatever and also after delivery to a third perzon on
certain extrinsic conditions. Thus in Y. B. 10 Hen. VI, f. 25, pl. 85:
"JOHN T. brings an action of Debt on three obligations against one K.
"NEWTON: We say that the deeds on which the plaintiff has sued were
written and sealed by the defendant and delivered by him to H. E. as three
'escripts'; to-wit: if the plaintiff should execute a defeasance on certain
conditions and deliver it to H. E. to be delivered to the defendant .
then the said H. E. should deliver to the plaintiff the 'escrows' as deeds: and
we say that the defeasance . . . was not made or delivered to H. E.,
but thereafter the plaintiff took the 'escrows' out of H. E.'s possession.
Wherefore they are not the deeds of the defendant. Ready, etc . ..
"PASTON, J.: The plea is good: for if I am obliged by an 'ezcript,' it is
not my deed because it is not delivered to another person. If I seal the said
'escript' without delivering it, and the grantee afterwards seizes the 'escript,'
it is not my deed, because it is nothing but an 'escrow' until delivery has been
made to him. And so here, when the condition has not been performed, de-
livery is lacking.
"If I make a deed for 202 to James Strange, and I deliver it to a third
person as an 'escrow,' then if Strange takes the deed afterwards and brings
action against me I can properly plead not my dccd (nicnt mon fait), be-
cause there has been no delivery to Strange. So in this case while the con-
dition it not performed, they are not the deeds of the defendant, because the
deeds were delivered to H. E. as three 'escrows' until the condition shall be
performed . .
I As appears hereafter, it has come about that no second delivery is ever
necessary.
20 Y. B. 8 Hen. VI, f. 26, pl. 15.
21 Y. B. 27 Hen. VI, f. 7, pl. 3. The point was not decided.
22 See Y. B. 3 Edw. III, f. 30, pl. 38; 3 Edw. III, f. 46, pl. 32; 5 Edw. III,
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as well as obligations were delivered to a third person to hold
subject to stated parol conditions. These are practically all
cases where one of the parties brought detinue against the holder
of the chattel or the escrow, the latter replying that he did not
know whether or not the conditions were fulfilled and asking a
writ of "garnishment" against the other party to the agreement
to compel him to interplead with the plaintiff on the issue as to
the fulfillment of the conditions.
23
AN ESCROW IS OPERATIVE ON THE FIRST DELIVERY
Where a document has been delivered as an escrow the parties
almost always contemplate a second delivery in the future, and
a second delivery is in fact generally made by the depositary.
Out of this fact arose the idea that a conditional delivery or a de-
livery as an escrow could not be made to the grantee himself,
because in such case it is evident that no second delivery is con-
templated. Hence also arose the notion that the document does
not "take effect" until the second delivery, inasmuch as it is
expressly made clear that there are certain "effects" that it shall
not have at the first delivery. The document is said not to be a
" contract; or if it be a deed of conveyance it is said that title does
not pass. Such loose general statements are due to a failure to
analyze such concepts as "title" and "contract" and to observe
that legal effects are complex and not simple. The confusion of
mind and of statement is no less today than in the time of the
Year Books.
The function of an escrow or of a conditional delivery of a
document is to give security to both parties. The grantor or
promisor wishes to retain a certain property interest or not to
assume immediate duties and liabilities, and at the same time to
be assured of getting certain values in return. The grantee or
promisee wishes ample security that if he gives those return
values, he will actually be invested with the property that he
covets or with the contract rights for which he bargains. In
order that each party shall have this security it is necessary for
society to take notice of the escrow transaction and to indicate
that societal action will be in large measure determined thereby.
This is what is meant by "legal relations," by saying that a docu-
ment "takes effect" or is legally "operative," and by such terms
as "property interest" and "contract rights."
The courts did not hesitate to make the escrow subserve the
f. 17, pl. 15; 7 Edw. III, f. 29, pl. 23; 25 Edw. III, f. 92, pl. 5; 31 Edw. III,
f. 1, pl. 2.
23 See Y. B. 39 Edw. III, f. 22 b; 3 Hen. IV, f. 18, pl. 15; 13 Hen. IV, f. 8,
pl. 24; 8 Hen. VI, ff. 36, 37, pl. 5; 9 Hen. VI, ff. 38, 39, pl. 15; 10 Hen. VI,
f. 25, pl. 85; 11 Hen. VI, f. 5, pl. 10; 14 Hen. VI, f. 1, pl. 4; 19 Hen. VI,
f. 58, pl. 22; 20 Hen. VI, ff. 28, 29, pl. 23; ROLms ABR., tit. Entrepleder.
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economic function for which it was designed. They made it take
effect upon court action and made it excellent security for both
palties.
First, it is undisputed that after delivery as an escrow the
grantor or promisor has no power of revocation. The grantee
or promisee is in a position of legal immunity or safety. This
shows that the transaction has no longer the status of an unac-
cepted offer. The delivery of the document to the grantee vil
be specifically compelled, even though before fulfillment of the
conditions the grantor has instructed the depositary not to deliver
it; 25 and the document is operative, even though the grantor has
made a conveyance to a third person, - , or has regained possession
of the document and destroyed it.2
7
Secondly, no new delivery by the depositary to the grantee is
necessary to invest the latter with all the legal relations intended
by the parties as the final consummation of the transaction.
Upon fulfillment of conditions the grantee will be regarded as
owner as completely as if the document had been delivered form-
ally into his hands. -8 If the escrow is a promissory document,
action will lie thereon, if all conditions are fulfilled, without any
delivery into the hands of the promisee.20  Even though a second
delivery by or on behalf of the grantor or obligor has become
impossible by reason of death or coverture before the fulfillment
of the conditions, upon such fulfillment the document will be made
fully operative.30 To effect this result, the doctrine of "relation
24 Graham v. Graham, 1 Ves. Jr. 272 (Ex. 1791) ("the authority was not
countermandable or determinable"); Naylor v. Stene, 9G Minn. 57, 109
N. W. 685 (1905).
25 Baum's Appeal, 113 Pa. 58 (1886). If specific enforcement is not poz-
sible, damages will be awarded. Naylor v. Stene, epra note 24.26 Beelan v. Frost, 18 John. 544 (N. Y. 1320) ; Cannon v. Handley, 72
Calif. 133, 13 Pac. 315 (187). Of course the effect of recording acb would
here be involved.
The grantee is preferred over the grantor's heir or devizee. Gammon v.
Bunnell, 22 Utah, 421, 64 Pac. 953 (1900) ; Chadwick v. Tatem, 9 Mont. '44,
23 Pac. 729 (1890).
The grantor cannot render the transaction inoperative by refusing per-
formance of the condition or by imposing new conditions. Craddock v.
Barnes, 142 N. C. 89, 54 S. E. 1003 (1906).
27 Hudson v. Hudson, supra note 8; Wymark's Case, 5 Co. 7-1 (K. B. 1599).
28 Regan v. Howe, 121 Blass. 424 (1877) ; Gardiner v. Gardiner, 3G Idaho,
664, 214 Pac. 219 (1923).
29 Couch v. Mleeker, 2 Conn. 302 (1817).
The surrender of an escrow bond by the depositary bach into the hands
of the obligor was held to be a conversion in Young v. Clarendon, 26 Fed.
805 (C. C. Mich. 1886).
30Y. B. 27 Hen. VI. f. 7, pl. 3; Perryman's Case, 5 Co. 84 (C. P. 1599);
Graham v. Graham, supra note 24 (bond delivered by depositary after the
obligor's death); Frosett v. Walshe, J. Bridg. 49 (C. P. 1617) (coverture) ;
4 KENT, op. cit. supra note 12, at 454; SITH, op. cit. upra note 10, at 11;
SHEPPARD, TOUCHSTONE, *59 ; Wheelwright v. Wheelwright, sazpra note 8.
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back" was appealed to, Chancellor Kent saying that "justice re-
quires a resort to a fiction." 31 It can and should be described in
more realistic fashion, recognizing that the property interest is
divided between grantor and grantee, and that contract rights
may be future and conditional in this case as in others.
Thirdly, it has been and should be held, in cases where a deed
of conveyance is delivered as an escrow, or to the grantee on
condition, that the grantee has a property interest before any
second delivery, an interest that is subject to execution by his
creditors 32 and one that includes a power of making conveyances
to others.33 Doubtless these in some measure depend upon the
character of the conditions upon which the escrow was delivered.
Possession, with its complex jural relations, may be vested in
either party as they may agree.34  If possession is still in the
grantor, he will usually be the one entitled to rents and profits."
If the subject matter is land, the grantee has an interest that
will descend to his heir.30 It is beyond the scope of this article
to consider in detail this division of the property interest or to
discuss apparent conflicts in the decisions.
The vitally important and operative fact is not a second de-
livery of the document, whether a conveyance or a contract; it
is the fulfillment of the condition. As stated above, such fulfill-
31 4 KENT, op. cit. supra note 12, at 454. As to this Professor Ballantine,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 830, acutely says: "Relation back is, according to
this theory, not a fiction at all. It is simply a description of the fact that the
grantee acquires some species of power or contingent property interest ab
initio, which is not affected by subsequent transactions or events such as
death, incapacity, or transfers of title by the grantor." It should be ob-
served, however, that "relation back" is, not ordinarily so understood (if
it is understood at all). Very likely it is always possible to squeeze the fiction
out of ancient language and pump into it a modern and more realistic mean-
ing.
32 Shirley v. Ayres, 14 Ohio, 307 (1846). The grantor's interest is also
subject to execution and attachment; but the creditor gets only the limited
interest of the grantor, the rents and profits as long as the grantor was
entitled to them and security for the unpaid price. May v. Emerson, 52
Or. 262, 96 Pac. 454, 1065 (1908); Wittenbrock v. Cass, 110 Calif. 1, 42
Pac. 300 (1895); Ranken v. Donovan, 166 N. Y. 626, 60 N. E. 1119 (1899).
33 Spring Garden Bank v. Hulings Lumber Co., 32 W. Va. 357, 9 S. E. 243
(1889); Santaquin Mining Co. v. High Roller Mining Co., 25 Utah, 282,
71 Pac. 77 (1903).
84 See Davis v. Jones, supra note 3, where a lease was delivered on condi-
tion that it was not to be operative until certain repairs should be made, but
the tenant had "possession."
35 See Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 4, at 402; Bigelow, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 567. The grantor has been held to be an "owner" within the meaning
of a statute requiring the signatures of owners to a petition. Hull v. San-
gamon Dist., 219 Ill. 454, 76 N. E. 701 (1906). The grantee might be held
to be an owner also, with equal reason, unless the statute is so drawn as to
preclude the recognition of divided ownership for the purposes of the statute.
36 Stone v. Duvall, 77 Ill. 475 (1875) ; Lindley v. Groff, 37 Minn. 338, 34
N. W. 26 (1887).
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ment makes the document fully operative without any new de-
livery; and it is likewise true that a new delivery without fulfill-
ment of the condition is not operative at all except in cases where




EXTRINSIC CONDITIONS AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
When a deed or contractual document is delivered as an escrow
subject to some extrinsic condition, it is almost universally held
that this extrinsic condition can be proved by parol testimony.
Why is not such testimony excluded by the parol evidence rule?
The answer usually given is that this rule has no application until
there is a completed contract or a delivered deed, and that a
document delivered as an escrow is not a contract or a deed until
final delivery to the grantee, or at least until the happening of the
condition.38  That the document is legally operative without any
37 Smith v. S. Royalton Bank, 32 Vt. 341 (1859); Powers v. Rude, 141 Ohla.
381, 79 Pac. 99 (1904); Clark v. Gifford, supra- note 14; Everts v. Agnes,
4 Wis. 343 (1856), 6 Wis. 453 (1859); Daggett v. Daggett, 143 Mass. 516,
10 N. E. 311 (1897) (grantor can plead Zon est factzun even though grantee
has possession of the deed) ; State Bank v. Evans, sz pra note 13; Grindle
v. Grindle, 240 Ill. 143, 88 N. E. 473 (1909); Crane v. Hutchinson, 3 Ill.
App. 30 (1878) (bill in equity lies to set aside a deed fraudulently obtained
and recorded without fulfillment of condition); Houston v. Adams, 85 Fla.
291, 95 So. 859 (1923) (grantor wins as against a bona fide purchaser from
the grantee); Ford v. Moody, 169 Ark. 649, 276 S. W. 595 (1925) (breach
of contract by grantor is not equivalent to performance of the condition).
In Smith v. S. Royalton Bank, supra, at 347, 318, the court said: "Until
the condition is performed the deed is of no more force than it would have
been if the grantor, after signing and sealing the instrument, had deposited
it in his own desk. . . The deed not having been delivered [the second
time] it was a nullity and void, or more properly speaking, -mcvc; c.dstcd."
As shown above, statements like this go altogether too far.
In Hubbard v. Greeley, 84 Me. 340, 24 Atl. 799 (1892) the court very
properly held that the grantor was estopped to prove the extrinsic condition
as against an innocent purchaser for value from the grantee, the delivery
as an escrow having been to the grantee himself.
38 Thus in SHEPPARD, TOUCHSTOiNE, 59, it is said: "It is of no more
force until the conditions be performed, than if I had made it and laid it
by me and not delivered it at all." But the author goes on to say that the
deed is operative on fulfillment of the condition even though that occurs
after the death of the grantor or the grantee "for there was traditio in-
ciwata in lifetime of the parties; and postca consuvazata czsistcns by the
performance of the conditions, it taketh effect by the first delivery, without
any new or second delivery."
In Hubbard v. Greeley, supra note 37, at 348, 24 Atl. at 801, the court
says: "Escrows are deceptive instruments. They are not what they pur-
port to be. They purport to be instruments which have been delivered,
when in fact they have not been delivered.'
In Wheelwright v. Wheelwright, supra note 8, at 452, Parsons, C. J., said:
"It is not the grantor's deed until the second delivery"; but he held that the
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second delivery and before fulfillment of the condition has been
shown above; it is the contention of this article that there is a
deed or contract from the moment of the first delivery, that prop-
erty or contract rights are created thereby, that such rights are
conditional in exactly the same way that they would have been
had the condition been expressed in the words of the instrument
itself, that parol proof of the extrinsic condition clearly varies
from the words of the document and vitally alters its effect in
the very teeth of the parol evidence rule.3
We need not be in the least disturbed that we find here another
breach in the parol evidence rule. That rule already has so many
exceptions that only with difficuity can it be correctly stated in
the form of a rule. It still serves a useful purpose in helping to
prevent the alteration of contracts by mistaken or perjured testi-
mony produced by reason of interests realized only after the con-
tract was made; but the strict application of the rule would do
far more harm than good in the case of escrow deliveries. The
rule is in the main a guide to the courts in their difficult task of
determining what were the actual events of yesterday. We may
use it with appreciation even though it is neither a mechanical
nor an unfailing guide. What we cannot do without serious
damage to ourselves and to our system of justice is to make
specious and inaccurate distinctions in the cases where we prefer
not to follow it.
Pym v. Campbell4o is a case that is most often cited in this
regard in contract law. A document was drawn up and signed
by all parties purporting to be a contract for the sale to the de-
fendant of an interest in an invention. In a suit for the price,
the defendant offered evidence to show that it was orally agreed
that the document should not be an operative "agreement" unless
A, an engineer, should approve of the invention, that it was
drawn up and signed in order that the parties should not have to
meet again in case A should approve, and that A did not in fact
approve. This evidence was held to be admissible in spite of the
parol evidence rule. Erle, J., said: "the evidence showed that
deed was operative even though the second delivery was after the grantor's
death.
In Jackson v. Catlin, 2 Johns. 248, 261 (N. Y. 1807) Kent, Ch. J., said:
"No interest whatever in the premises had vested. Jones [the buyer] had
nothing, not even a scintilla juris, in the land, which he could assign so as
to enable the assignee to perform the condition." But this was said in order
to prevent the state from forfeiting the buyer's estate by act of attainder,
the state attempting to make the payment constituting the condition in order
to effectuate the attainder.
See also Smith v. S. Royalton Bank, supra note 37, and quotations from
(1926) AmERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, infra note 51.
39 The writer has stated a similar conclusion in Conditions in the Law of
Contract (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 739, '764.
4 0Supra note 1.
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DELIVERY OF WRITTEN CONTRACTS
in fact there was never any agreement at all"; and also, "evi-
dence to vary the terms of an agreement in writing is not ad-
missible, but evidence to show that there is not an agreement at
all is admissible."
It is not certain just what was the court's definition of the
word "agreement"; but to the writer it seems perfectly clear
that factually the partdes were in perfect agreement on all terms;
that they mutually expressed that agreement in every respect,
mainly in writing but partly by parol; that the document was
executed for the express reason that the parties wished to avoid
the necessity of any further expression of their agreement; and
that they merely provided orally that they should not be abso-
lutely bound unless and until A should approve of the invention.
Had A expressed approval there can be no doubt that the contract
as written would have been enforceable without any further e::-
pressions of offer or acceptance and without any further delivery.
The evidence was undisputed that both parties had agreed upon
this. Had either buyer or seller prevented A from expressing
an opinion of the invention or repudiated the contract before A
had any opportunity to form an opinion, the other could have
maintained a suit for damages. Therefore, the evidence so far
from showing that there "was not an agreement at all" showed
instead that there was exact agreement and showed fully and
completely the terms of that agreement. The legal operation of
that agreement was exactly the same as if the condition of A's
approval had been written into the document itself thus: The
rights and duties of the parties hereto are hereby made condi-
tional upon the approval of the invention by A.
It appears, therefore, that the oral evidence varied the writing
and altered its effect. It showed that the writing was not what
it purported on its face to be-a complete statement of the terms
of agreement. It showed that the contract of purchase and sale
was conditional instead of unconditional.
We must not argue from this that oral evidence is always
admissible to show that a writing is not a complete statement of
agreement and to add a new term or provision thereto. In nearly
all the cases where such evidence has been admitted, it showed
not only that the delivered document did not express all the terms
of the exsting agreement but also that there was an extrinsic
condition affecting all promises of the contract alike. If the
condition is not fulfilled and one party does not have to perform,
the other party does not have to perform either. If the oral
evidence varies one of the promises and makes it conditional, it
varies the return promise also and makes it conditional on the
very same event. Thus the oral evidence does not affect the ratio
of value between the promised performances.41  In a bilateral
4' So, in Pym v. Campbell, snpra note 1, if A did not approve the invention,
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contract one promise is not left absolute and unconditional while
the other is being proved by parol to be aleatory and conditional
in the teeth of its written words. In such cases as these, oral evi-
dence of the extrinsic' condition is admissible even though the
writing specifies one or more other conditions in express words. 42
Where the contract is unilateral, the admission of oral proof
of an extrinsic condition may work injustice. Thus, where a
writing contains a promise by B for a specified consideration
already fully executed by A, to allow B to give oral proof of an
extrinsic condition would affect the parties unequally. The con-
sideration already given by A would not be affected, but the
promise of B given in return is turned into an aleatory and con-
ditional one and hence of less value. There is greater danger
that the testimony is fraudulent or mistaken. Cases refusing
to admit oral proof of an extrinsic condition are sometimes of this
sort, although the distinction is seldom put into words. If the
contract is merely a unilateral specialty, there having been no
executed consideration, proof of an extrinsic condition does not
reduce the value of an agreed exchange, for the promisee has
given none. Instead, it prevents the promisee from getting
something for nothing. If B has delivered his sealed promise to
pay A $1,000, he should be allowed to prove that his promise was
conditional on A's making a specified conveyance. Here the
condition that he attempts to prove is really the specified equiva-
lent of his money; and unless he can prove it there is failure of
consideration and fraud.43
the buyer would not have to pay the price, but neither would the seller have
to transfer his interest. In Whitaker v. Lane, 128 Va. 317, 104 S. E. 252
(1920) a written bilateral contract for the sale of land was shown to be
conditional upon the granting of a corporate charter. The condition not
happening, neither had to perform. In Wallis v. Littell, 11 C. B. N. S.
369 (1861) a bilateral contract for the sale of land was proved to be cond-
tional in that "the said agreement should be null and void if Lord Sydmn'i
should not . . . consent to the transfer." Ware v. Allen, supra note 1,
followed Pym v. Campbell and admitted evidence to show that a bilateral
contract for the sale of certain notes was to be of no effect if the defendant's
lawyer disapproved. The cases admitting parol evidence are almost in-
variably of this sort. Blewitt v. Boorum, 142 N. Y. 357, 37 N. E. 119
(1894) ; Hurlburt v. Dusenbery, 26 Colo. 240, 57 Pac. 860 (1899) ; Trumbull
v. O'Hara, 71 Conn. 172, 41 Atl. 546 (1898).
42 Expressio unius is not here exclusio alteiius. Golden v. lMleier, 129 Wis.
14, 107 N. W. 27 (1906) (document expressly provided that no signer should
be bound until all signed; extrinsic condition that the signers should not
be bound until certain written pledges were secured); Case Threshing
Machine Co. v. Barnes, 133 Ky. 321, 117 S. W% 418 (1909) (document pro-
vided that machine was "purchased upon the following conditions and no
other"; but parol evidence was admitted to show that the sale was also
conditional on a satisfactory test of the machine).
4
3
1n Colvin v. Goff, 82 Or. 314, 161 Pac. 568 (1916) oral evidence to show
that a promissory note was to be payable only in a certain event was ex-
cluded; but the court said at 325, 161 Pac. at 572: "It may be shown as
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The fact that there have been many cases misapplying the rule
because of faulty analysis must not lead us to doubt the accuracy
of the rule itself. If in fact there has been no complete mutual
agreement and no operative delivery of a document, the parol
evidence rule does not apply. The mere existence of a document
does not prove either agreement or delivery. The delivery of a
document as an escrow subject to an extrinsic condition and
mutual agreements in writing subject to a parol condition must
be distinguished from cases where there has been no operative
delivery of a document and no mutual agreement at all. A trans-
action may be in the stage of inoperative preliminary negotiation
or in the stage of an unaccepted offer. In these latter cases the
reason that there is no contract is that there have been as yet no
mutual expressions of agreement and that no legal obligation is
intended to exist until one or both of the parties have given a new
expression of will. One who has in form promised to perforn
only in case he subsequently wishes to do so has not promised at
all.4 - The essence of legal duty is that the force of society will
be used to induce performance or to punish non-perforniance.
Therefore, whenever it can be shown that no societal force to
induce or to punish will be used against a person unless he first
expresses his will that it be so used there is no legal duty and
he has not made a contract.
Thus a document can be shown to have been a mere preliminary
and inoperative draft that was not an expression of assent.4
It can be shown to have been signed with the express understand-
ing that it should be inoperative until one of the parties has noti-
fied the other that he is willing to be bound by it.4r It can be
shown that a document has not been delivered as an escrow but
merely handed to the promisor's own agent, the first and only
operative delivery to be made later.47 In these cases, whether
between the maker and the payee that its payment was made conditional,
whenever the condition or contingency affects the consideration; that is to
say, if the maker of the note stipulates that it shall take effect only upon
the happening of an event, and the failure of such contingency affects the
consideration to the extent that he does not get the value or the thing that
he has bargained for, it is a good defense."
-1 See discussion of "illusory" promises in Corbin, Non-binding Pro iXcs
as Consideration (1926) 26 COL. L. R-v. 550; also, The Effect of Options
on Consideration (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOuRvL, 471.
45 Wiltse v. Fifield, 143 Iowa, 332, 121 N. W. 1086 (1909) ; Colonial Park
Estates v. Mlassart, 112 Md. 648, 77 Atl. 275 (1910).
46 Massachusetts Biographical Soc. v. Howard, 234 Mass. 483, 125 N. E.
605 (1919). Where an agent delivered an insurance policy subject to the
approval of the home office, the transaction is still an unaccepted offer,
and neither party is bound, even conditionally. Young v. Newark Ins. Co.,
59 Conn. 41, 22 Atl. 32 (1890).
47 Pattle v. Hornibrook (18973 1 Ch. 25 (lease handed to leszor's own
solicitor, not to be delivered to the lessee until later and meantime subject
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written or unwritten, sealed or unsealed, there is no contract be-
cause there has been no final expression of will by the party to
be charged. The transaction is not yet irrevocable and will not
become fully operative and enforceable upon the happening of a
specified condition. If enforceability still depends upon subse-
quent voluntary expressions of the parties, or of the party de-
livering the document, there is truly no escrow and no contract;
parol evidence of all the existing facts is certainly admissible.
CONDITIONAL DELIVERY V. CONDITIONAL OBLIGATION
As stated above, oral evidence of an extrinsic condition has
generally been admitted on the theory that it shows that there
has been no contract made. This erroneous idea has sometimes
been expressed in this form: oral evidence is admissible to prove
that the delivery was conditional but not to prove that the obliga-
tion was conditional. In Burns v. Doyle,4 8 action was brought
upon the written acceptance of a bill. The defendant tried to
show that his acceptance was not to be binding on him except
upon a certain extrinsic condition. The court, following Pir v.
Campbell, said that the defendant's evidence was not admissible
to show "a conditional acceptance" but was admissible under
proper pleadings to show "a conditional delivery of an accept-
ance,-a delivery under the terms of which the writing signed
by the defendant never became a contract at all."
Again, a learned note-writer has said: "The principle that a
conditional delivery may be shown is clear. But it is exceedingly
difficult to determine from the evidence whether a situation is
presented in which the intent of the parties went to the delivery
of the instrument, making it conditional, or merely to its obliga-
tion." 49 The reason that it is "difficult" is believed to be that
the distinction is purely imaginary. A condition, whether ex-
pressed in the writing or extrinsically expressed, is always meant
to affect the resulting legal relations, the legal "obligation," the
legal "effect" of the transaction. "Delivery" is always factual
in character; it always consists of conduct, although definitions
vary somewhat in specifying the kind of conduct that will be an
operative delivery. Suppose that there has been a physical tra-
dition of a written document accompanied by a statement that it
is to bind only if A approves 0 The statement also is conduct;
to lessor's orders) ; Porter v. Woodhouse, supra note 5 (box of papers handed
to grantor's own servant); Powers v. Rude, supra note 37.
48 71 Conn. 742, 43 AtI. 483 (1897).
49 (1922). 20 A. L. R. 421, 428. WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 6, § 2435,
attempts a similar distinction; an'd, like the note-writer, adds: "Here some
subtlety of construction may be required."
5o As in Pyme v. Campbell, supra note 1.
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DELIVERY OF WRITTEN CONTRACTS
and we can, if we please, so define delivery as to include both the
physical tradition and the statement accompanying it. But in
any case, the only purpose and the only effect of the statement
is to determine the resulting legal relations and make them con-
ditional-to point out that one more fact must occur before
societal remedies are available. Already most of the facts neces-
sary to make those remedies available have happened, and they
need not be repeated again. Offer, acceptance, writing, delivery
-these have all occurred, and already form the basis for legal
prediction. That prediction must be a conditional prediction,
just exactly as it would have to be if the condition had been ex-
pressed in the writing instead of extrinsically, the prediction
(the legal operation) being identical in either case.
It is believed that the legal operation of the following trans-
actions is identical: (1) A delivers to B his sealed promise: "I
promise to pay B $1,000 for Blackacre if X approves title." (2)
A delivers to C his sealed promise: "I promise to pay B $1,000
for Blackacre," at the same time instructing C to hold the docu-
ment for B and to deliver it to him only after X has approved
title. (3) A hands to B his sealed promise: "I promise to pay
B $1,000 for Blackacre," saying to B, "This delivery is conditional
on approval of title by X." (4) A hands to B the same document,
saying: "Mly obligation is to be conditional on approval of title
by X." With equal propriety, each of these can be called a con-
ditional delivery, a conditional promise, or a conditional obliga-
tion. Number (2) is the typical escrow because of the delivery
to a third person; but the legal relations between A and B are not
different from those in the other three cases. In all alike there
is a valid contract under seal, although the obligation in each case
is conditional.5 '
In further illustration, suppose (a) that an insurance company
delivers a policy in which it promises to pay if the house burns
(and on other specified conditions). No one doubts that the com-
pany is "bound" from the moment of delivery of the sealed policy.
51 The writer therefore differs with (1926) AziERICAN' LIAW INSTITuTr,
CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT No. 2, § 92, which reads: "The requirements of
the law for the formation of a contract under seal are: (a) A sealed written
promise and delivery, either unconditionally or in escrow, of the document
containing it; and if the delivery is in escrow, the happening of the condi-
tion on which delivery is made." If the delivery of an escrow on condition
is operative in exactly the same way that it would have been had the
condition been expressly stated in the words of the promise, then we have a
"contract" without "the happening of the condition on which delivery is
made." This contract is a "contract under seal" because of its form, and
its operation is determined by the rules applicable to such formal contracts.
We must.call it a "contract" unless we are prepared to say that no condi-
tional promise is ever a "contract." It is unlikely that any juristic writer
has ever said as much.
A like exception is taken to the RESTATEMENT, § 98: "A promise under seal
461
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There is a "contract under seal" from that moment, even though
the chance of ever having to pay anything is not one in a hundred.
We call it so because of its irrevocability and because its enforce-
ability merely awaits the happening of the condition. It makes
no difference whether the policy is delivered to the insured or to
a third person in escrow for him.
Now suppose (b) that the insurer should deliver his uncon-
ditional sealed promise to pay the same sum of money, the de-
livery being to a third person with an instruction to him to hold
for the benefit of the promisee but not to deliver to the promisee
until his house burns. Exactly as in (a) we have a promise, to
the same person and for the same performance. We have the
same irrevocability; 52 and enforceability merely awaits the hap-
pening of the condition. A subsequent delivery to the promisee
is not necessary; and the destruction of the document or recovery
of its possession by the insurer would not destroy the promisee's
right or prevent enforcement by action if the condition is later
fulfilled.
In both (a) and (b) there is a "binding" promise and a "con-
tract under seal." In both alike the promisee has a "conditional
right" and the promisor is under a "disability" to destroy it. The
promisor has the correlative "conditional duty" and will be com-
pelled to increase his reserve fund accordingly. The fact that in
(b) the condition was only orally and extrinsically expressed is
immaterial so long as the courts permit it to be proved and to
give it effect. This they in fact do.
The problem herein discussed turns on the distinction between
a "right" and a "conditional right." This has been discussed at
length by the present writer in previous numbers of this
JOURNAL.53 The relation between two persons described by the
terms "right" and "dfity" is not a res with objective physical
existence. Those terms are merely shorthand expressions to state
the facts of the past and to predict events of the future. Because
of certain facts of the past, such as offer, acceptance, consider-
ation, delivery, etc., courts and other officers will use compulsion
against one for the benefit of the other. We express this briefly
without enumerating the past facts or specifying the exact form
of the future compulsion by saying that the one has a legal duty
and the other a legal right. But in the creation of such right
may be delivered by the promisor unconditionally, in which case there is a
present contract under seal; or may be delivered in escrow in which case
there is no present contract under seal."
52 That it is "irrevocable" is expressly stated as the law in the CONTRACTS
RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, § 100; and in WMLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920)
§ 212.
53 Rights and Duties (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 501, 511; Conditions
in the Law of Contract (1919) 28 ibid. 739.
462,
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DELIVERY OF WRITTEN CONTRACTS 463
and duty the operative facts never occur at a single moment of
time; they always occur in a chronological series. After all the
necessary operative facts have occurred (except the mere pro-
cedural process, pleading, and evidence) we say that there is a
present, vested, absolute, unconditional right. If most of the
operative facts have occurred, but one necessary fact has not
occurred, and is uncertain of occurrence, we say that there is a
future and conditional right. Conditional contracts (and this
includes most contracts) fall within the latter category. It is
a mere matter of convenience whether we call them "contracts"
at all; but such convenience appears to be fully established and
usage is settled.
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